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Abstract
This paper replies to Chowdhury’s (2010) response to the paper "Board Composition and Firm
Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh" (2010). It challenges the strength of the criticisms,
arguing that the factors discussed in Chowdhury (2010) do not necessarily impair the outcome of
the research. The authors elucidate issues raised, and in so doing, reproduce the results
incorporating the commentator’s suggestions.
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Introduction
We thank the commentator (Chowdhury 2010) for recognising the contribution of our study, and
providing specific recommendations for our research. In this response, the authors elucidate
issues raised, and in doing, reproduce the results incorporating the commentator’s suggestions.
We recognise Chowdhury has an economic discipline’s perspective on the accounting study, and
argue that the contextual factors discussed in his reply do not necessarily impair the outcome of
the Rashid et al. (2010) paper.
Points of Clarification
Focus of the Paper
Chowdhury (2010) identifies the results of Rashid et al. (2010) as complementing the findings of
Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007), that the age and size of the board of directors do not have
significant impact on corporate governance disclosures. However, the authors clarify that a
comparison of the findings cannot be drawn, because the focus of our research is examining a
different aspect. Rather than examining the impact of governance attributes on disclosure,
Rashid et al. (2010) examine the effect of board composition on firm performance.
Limitation of Literature Review
Chowdhury (2010), in acknowledging the comprehensive nature of the literature review,
suggests that inclusion of studies on South Asian countries would improve the contribution of the
study. The authors concur. Regrettably, there is a dearth of published empirical studies on the
impact of corporate governance on firm performance in South Asia in general, and specifically
on the impact of corporate board composition and its effects on firm performance. Our research
did not discover any directly comparable literature for South Asia. However, there are limited
more general studies such as Shah, Zafar and Durrani (2009), who investigate the earnings
management motives of independent directors in Pakistan. This is recognised as an area for
further research.
Sample Size
The authors thank the commentator for his observation in his first footnote, of inconsistent
terminology regarding sample size. We confirm that the sample size on page 77 of our paper
should be 274 firm-years, consistent with page 76 and Table 1 on page 83.
The Model: Theoretical Underpinnings.
Rashid et al. (2010) make reference to established research on board composition and firm
performance, premised on the tenets of agency theory. These studies provide theoretical
justification for the explanators of the model used in our study that targets the Bangladeshi
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context. In this respect we refute the allegation our model is ad hoc with no theoretical
underpinnings.
The Model: Discussion of Variables
Chowdhury (2010) argues that the regression model of Rashid et al. (2010) may be misspecified,
as it leaves out some important variables such as retained earnings and R&D expenditure, and
that this will result in omitted variable bias (p. 104). Further, he suggests that the explanators
used only capture the managerial aspects of the firm, and ignore demand-supply, innovation and
technological aspects which also contribute to profit (Chowdhury 2010, p.105).
The authors acknowledge these points. In any linear regression model, many variables
may be included. However, any study must put a limit to the number of variables, and make
choices as to their relevance. There is inevitably inherent bias as not all explanatory variables are
known or can be incorporated. The authors chose the explanatory variables based upon those
identified in the findings of previous literature (Rashid et al. 2010, pp.84-85). The authors’ aim
was to limit the independent variables within the corporate governance attributes, subject to
availability of data. For example, while R&D is a recognised explanatory variable, many listed
firms in Bangladesh do not appropriately disclose R&D expenditure in their disclosure
documents, despite adopting a process of convergence with international accounting standards in
1999 (see for example Mir & Rahman 2005).
Chowdhury (2010) suggests the Hausman test or Ramsy's RESET (Regression
Specification Error Test) be run (p.108) to justify the appropriateness of the variables in the
model. The authors conducted the Ramsay's RESET by using E-Views to determine if additional
variables could be fitted within the regression model (see Table 1). The results suggest while
additional variables could be fitted within the Tobin’s Q model, this is not so for the ROA
model. It is worthy to note that Ramsay's RESET does not suggest which variable(s) should be
included and the inclusion of another variable into the model may even increase the bias.
Acknowledging these limitations, we also conducted the 'omitted variable-likelihood
ratio' test to determine whether the omitted variables ‘retained profit’ (as suggested by
Chowdhury 2010), ‘firms growth’ and ‘firms risk’ (measured as Standard Deviation of
movement of stock price per month or stock price volatility) play an important role in the Rashid
et al. (2010) model. From the results of the test in Table 1, the authors notice that, except for risk
in ROA model, inclusion of all of these variables did not play an important role in either of the
models. Asteriou and Hall (2007, p.344) while mentioning the advantages of ‘panel data’ noted
that, "the basic idea behind panel data analysis comes from the notion that the individual
relationship will all have same parameters. This is sometimes known as pooling assumptions".
They maintain that, if the pooling assumption is correct, the problem of omitted variables which
may cause biased estimates in a single individual regression may not occur in a panel context.
Because we have already conducted Ramsey's RESET and 'omitted variable-likelihood ratio', the
CUSUM and CUSUM Square Test would be repetition and thus are not conducted. The
preference for a dynamic model is contestable.
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Table 1
Diagnostics
Model
Ramsey RESET

ROA
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Tobin’s Q

Ramsey RESET
[after including Growth, Risk, and Retained Profit]
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Growth)
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Risk)
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Retained Profit)

F-Statistics

P- Value

1.5227
9.8009
9.865109
18.4319
0.040859
0.029430
20.07498
39.62854
2.237619
48.03429

0.2183
0.0000
0.0019
0.0000
0.8400
0.8639
0.0000
0.0000
0.1359
0.0000

***
***
***
***
***
***

* p  0.10; ** p  0.010; *** p  0.001.

Relationship between Firm Age and Performance
Chowdhury (2010) questions the inclusion of firm age as a control variable within Rashid et al.’s
(2010) model, arguing a “a non-monotonic relationship is implied between age of the firm and
firm’s profitability” (p.105); “it may be misleading to relate profitability with the age of the
firm” arguing that “older firms suffer from inertia and a failure to innovate and thus they
degenerate into oblivion” (p.106). He further argues that the “over-concentration of family
ownership control is the surest sign of a non-monotonic relationship between firm-age and
profitability. For instance, the death of a family patriarch and/or falling-out among feuding
family members often leads to disintegration within the firm management and adversely affects
the profitability and viability of the firm” (pp.105-106). He subsequently mentions the examples
of Quasem Group of Companies, Ilias Brothers and the Partex Group of firms which experienced
such a disintegration and/or division.
The authors note that the relationship between firm age and performance has been clearly
established in the literature (for example, Ang, Cole & Lin 2000; Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wellset
1998; Harjoto & Hoje 2008; Loderer & Waelchli 2009; Majumdar & Chhibber 1999; Tian &
Lau 2001). Because of the possible influences of firm age on firm performance, many of these
studies have included it as a control variable in their models. In his commentary on the
relationship between firm age and firm performance, Chowdhury neglects to not distinguish
between different corporate forms. Chowdhury’s (2010) arguments are based upon Private
Limited Companies (which are not listed on any stock exchanges) and as such have a
fundamentally different governance structure and legal requirements to the firms included in the
Rashid et al. study, which is based on public limited companies listed on Bangladesh stock
exchanges. Private Limited Companies are not required to appoint outside independent directors,
while publically listed companies are required to have outside independent directors. These
companies have a formal accountability structure (have a formal board and management), hold
annual general meetings, and prepare disclosure documents (subject to financial audit and
scrutinised by the regulatory body Securities and Exchange Commission Bangladesh). A listed
company and a private company have different ownership and oversight and an equivalent nonmonotonic relationship cannot be inferred. Furthermore, the minimum firm age in Rashid et al.
(2010) is 8 years (antilog of 2.079 from minimum LOGAGE in the descriptive statistics in p.
86). This indicates our sample firms have survived competition. There is insufficient evidence to
support Chowdhury’s (2010) argument for the impact of rent extraction. Even if rent extraction
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by newer firms from older firms was occurring, the authors argue it cannot be inferred that there
is no relationship between firm age and performance.
We have not provided the theoretical or statistical justification for transforming some
variables into logarithms. We have done so to neutralise the variability in data and we have not
provided the explanation as we assumed that readers will be aware of such practice. Rashid et
al.’s (2010) results are presented in Table 5 of that paper.
Composition of Error Term
Chowdhury (2010) questions how homogeneity and independence are possible for firms in
different industry groups in the sample (p.106). We have acknowledged this limitation within our
paper (Rashid et al. 2010, p.89). In this regard we again quote from Asteriou and Hall (2007):
The basic idea behind panel data analysis comes from the notion that the individual relationship
will all have same parameters. This is sometimes known as pooling assumptions as we are in
effect pooling all the individual together into one dataset and imposing a common set of
parameters across them (Asteriou & Hall, p.344).

They further maintain that, if the pooling assumption is not correct, the panel is often
referred to as a heterogeneous panel (as the parameters are different across the individuals). Even
if this is the case, (except certain circumstances) it is normally expected that the panel data
estimator will give some representative estimate of the individual parameters. The only problem
we have in our data is the violation of pooling assumptions, as we have used an unbalanced panel
(as there are not 90 firms in all years) that may lead to 'unobserved heterogeneity'.
In response to the reviewer regarding the issue of variation across the firms and within a
firm (or firm specific characteristics) the authors carried out further analysis using a panel data
model. First, a Hausman Specification Test using E-Views was done to test the significance of
the difference between the fixed effect estimates and the random effect estimates. The Chi
Square (2) statistics and corresponding p-values of both the ROA and Tobin's Q model rejects
the null hypothesis that random effects are consistent (see Table 2). As such the authors have
now run the regression with a 'fixed effect model' (to capture the firm specific characteristics)
under both ROA and Tobin’s Q models. The results of the ROA model are consistent with the
conclusion of the Rashid et al. (2010) paper, that is, there is no significant relationship between
board composition and firm economic performance in Bangladesh. However, the results of the
Tobin’s Q model in this test show that there is a significant negative relationship between board
composition and firm performance. This additional analysis strengthens our original finding that
independent directors do not add potential economic value, by now suggesting that independent
directors may even reduce potential economic value to firms in Bangladesh.
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Table 2
Board composition and firm performance

Intercept
BDCOMP
DIROWN
LOGBDSIZE
CEOD
DEBT
LOGSIZE
LOGAGE
Adjusted R2
F-Statistic

Dependent Variables
(Before capturing firm specific
characteristics)
(a) ROA
(b) Tobin's Q
-1.798 ***
-0.078
(-5.855)
(-1.061)
0.418
0.144
(1.088)
(1.560)
0.039
0.020
(1.087)
(0.132)
-0.042 *
0.384 ***
(-1.724)
(3.765)
-0.110 *
0.011
(-1.842)
(0.757)
0.886 ***
-0.080 ***
(16.966)
(-6.356)
0.020 ***
0.049 ***
(6.237)
(3.731)
0.045 *
0.492 ***
(1.934)
(5.096)
0.302
17.468

0.586
54.887

***

Hausman Test (  2 )
P-value

Dependent Variables
(After capturing firm specific
characteristics)
(a) ROA
(b) Tobin's Q
-0.206
-7.896 ***
(-0.602)
(-7.646)
-0.152
-1.195 **
(-0.890)
(-2.312)
0.154
-0.451
(0.723)
(-0.701)
0.014
0.286
(0.204)
(1.345)
-0.026
0.035
(-0.672)
(0.301)
-0.103 ***
1.123 ***
(-3.417)
(12.346)
-0.027 **
0.024
(-2.922)
(0.888)
0.148
2.785 ***
(1.283)
(8.000)
0.585

***

0.888

5.000

***

23.554

***

27.3409
0.0003

***

48.1144
0.0000

***

This table presents the summary results of the board composition and firm performance under different performance
measures. Column (a) and (b) represent the coefficients of performance measures. The t-statistics are presented in
parentheses.
* p  0.10; ** p  0.010; *** p  0.001.

Sample Period
Chowdhury (2010, p.107) questions the inclusion of the years 2007 and 2008 in our sample. He
identifies them as being ‘abnormal’ years for the Bangladesh economy and politics, because in
2007 there was both a Bangladesh military coup which established a military-backed caretaker
government, and a severe flood followed by the devastating cyclone Sidr.
The authors are perplexed as to why Chowdhury identifies these factors as significant,
but then provides contradictory evidence to this argument in his selection of a quotation from the
Ministry of Finance Bangladesh (2009) which states “The economy of Bangladesh continue[s] to
demonstrate considerable resilience during FY 2008-09 despite the twin shocks arising from
global recessions and the adverse effects of the consecutive floods and the cyclone-Sidr” (as
cited in Chowdhury 2010 p.107). Floods and cyclones are very common in Bangladesh, and it is
questionable whether such natural disasters have an abnormal impact on overall business
activity. Furthermore, while Chowdhury (2010 p.107) contends “business confidence was low
and many businessmen ‘sat on their hands’ until the term of the caretaker government was over”
he offers no evidence supporting his conclusion that business activity was in the doldrums.
Indeed, this observation also is directly contradictory to evidence he later quotes referring to the
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FY 2008-09 “The economy is estimated to have grown at a rate of 5.9 percent, slightly below the
growth rate (6.2 percent) of FY2007-08”. The two performance indicators (sales and Tobin’s Q)
of the sample firms over 2008-09 also indicate that the overall performance is not abnormally
low during the “abnormal” 2007-08 period. Refer Figure 1 below.
Figure 1
Average Sample Firm Performance 2000-2009
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Institutional context is pivotal to the variables and sample size selected. Mandatory
corporate governance disclosures were introduced in 2006 by Securities and Exchange
Commission Bangladesh. A period of 2005-09 was selected for this study to capture the possible
impact over the period of this specific regulatory change. This point was missed by the
commentator.
Chowdhury (2010) argues that the Corporate Governance Notification 2006 (CGN) for
the appointment of outside independent directors was issued on 20 January 2006 and its effect
will only be known after a lag. In the Rashid et al. (2010) sample, 10 firms have outside directors
even before the CGN 2006 was issued. All other firms in the sample acknowledged their
obligation, which is evident from their disclosure documents by their respective year end. It is
contended the period is sufficient to capture any lag. The firms whose financial years end on 30
June had almost 6 months lag, while the firms whose years end on 31 December had almost one
year lag. Furthermore, although the condition of such appointment was not mandatory, noncompliance requires mandatory disclosure in the Director’s Report as per schedule 5.00 of the
CGN 2006, by order of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh.
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Results
Chowdhury (2010, p.108) contends an emphasis is placed on the statistical significance of the
coefficient in arriving at the conclusions, while ignoring its magnitude. The study found the
coefficient BDCOMP was positive but not statistically significant. Contrary to Chowdhury
positing that “the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of BDCOMP is substantial (0.144 and
0.418 respectively)”, the impact of an increase in this variable on firm performance is minute (an
increase of 0.118 (one standard deviation) in this variable is associated with mere 0.0118
increase in ROA and 0.0343 on Tobin’s Q). Therefore, the coefficient of BDCOMP in our results
is neither statistically significant (i.e. does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that there
is a relationship between board composition and firm performance) nor practically significant.
Table 3: Board composition and firm performance under different performance measures

Intercept
BDCOMP
DIROWN
LOGBDSIZE
CEOD
DEBT
LOGSIZE
LOGAGE
Adjusted R2
F-Statistic

Dependent Variables
(Before correcting for
heteroscedasticity)
(a) ROA
(b) Tobin's Q
-0.078
-1.798
***
(-1.061)
(-5.855)
0.144
0.418
(1.560)
(1.088)
0.039
0.020
(1.087)
(0.132)
-0.042
0.384
*
***
(-1.724)
(3.765)
0.011
-0.110
*
(0.757)
(-1.842)
-0.080
0.886
***
***
(-6.356)
(16.966)
0.020
0.049
***
***
(6.237)
(3.731)
0.045
0.492
*
***
(1.934)
(5.096)
0.302
17.468

0.586
***

54.887

Dependent Variables
(After correcting for
heteroscedasticity)
(a) ROA
(b) Tobin's Q
-1.824
-0.102
***
(-6.265)
(-1.070)
0.146
0.414
(1.883) *
(1.306)
0.031
0.008
(0.798)
(0.048)
-0.029
0.415
***
(-0.829)
(4.301)
0.008
-0.117
**
(0.689)
(-2.187)
-0.065
0.914
***
(-1.285)
(21.396)
0.018
0.046
***
(5.884) ***
(3.882)
0.046
0.483
***
(2.795) **
(4.460)
0.286

***

16.636

0.641
***

70.761

***

This table presents the summary results of the board composition and firm performance under different performance
measures. Column (a) and (b) represent the coefficients of performance measures. The t-statistics are presented in
parentheses.
* p  0.10; ** p  0.010; *** p  0.001.

Chowdhury (2010) also suggests running a diagnostic test for heteroskedasticity, and a
Jarque-Bera Test for normality. A Breusch–Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test was conducted through EViews. This test confirms the presence of heteroscedasticity. It is noted that heteroscedasticity is
very common in panel data (Asteriou & Hall 2007). Wrigley (1977 p.13) states
“heteroscedasticity does not result in biased parameter estimates, but it does result in a loss of
efficiency”. Despite heteroscedasticity, OLS estimators are linear, unbiased and are (under
general conditions) in large samples, normally distributed (Gujarati 2003, p.427). It is argued
that "heteroscedasticity has never been a reason to throw out an otherwise good model" (Mankiw
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1990, p.1648); "unequal error variance is worth correcting only when the problem is severe"
(Fox 1997, p.306); and "unless heteroscedasticity is very severe, one may not abandon OLS in
favour of GLS or WLS" (Gujarati 2003, p.400). Despite these considerations, we ran the
regressions by using the correction techniques of White (1980) for unknown heteroscedasticity.
The results show a change for the ROA performance measure, significant only at the 10% level.
Refer to Table 3 above.
The normality assumption requires that observations should be normally distributed in
the population. Coakes and Steed (2001) argue that the violations of this assumption are of little
concern, when the sample size is large (greater than 30). There were 90 firms in the sample and
the assumption of normality is confirmed through a Normal Q-Q Plot. The Residual
Test/Histogram-Normality Test of all equations produced a 'bell shape'. Normality was also
checked by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. Both tests do not reject the null
hypothesis of normality (at p 0.001). Also carried out was the Jarque-Bera test (Table 4), using
E-Views. It also does not reject the null hypothesis of normality (as p 0.001 in most cases).
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
ROA
Tobin’s Q

0.057
1.290

-1.494
0.335

0.287
6.226

Std.
Deviation
0.132
0.769

BDCOMP
DIROWN
LOGBDSIZE
CEOD
DEBT
SIZE
AGE

0.109
0.423
1.857
0.416
0.774
5.459
2.858

0.000
0.000
1.099
0.000
0.073
-4.200
2.079

0.333
0.960
2.485
1.000
5.619
10.724
3.466

0.082
0.190
0.304
0.494
0.629
2.398
0.312

Variables

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Probability

69.833
9.873

JarqueBera
55270.08
1372.42

-0.751
0.423
-0.102
-1.896
22.483
1.132
-0.836

8.126
2.065
3.530
45.921
6266.395
53.172
8.686

0.017
0.356
0.171
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.012

Skewness

Kurtosis

-6.278
2.566
-0.077
0.069
-0.269
0.344
4.061
-0.937
-0.082

0.000
0.000

Although it is not mentioned in Chowdhury (2010), we would like to address the possible
presence of endogeneity (the relationship between the independent variable with the error term)
in our model. In the presence of endogeneity OLS estimates can be biased and inconsistent.
While the endogeneity is an important factor, it is not fatal in doing empirical corporate
governance research (Denis 2001, p.198). Despite this consideration, we have checked the
possible presence of endogeneity in our model by carrying out a Hausman test. The output of the
Hausman test suggests that both the OLS and TSLS are consistent.
Discussion and Conclusion
Rashid et al. (2010, p.88) concluded that there is no statistically significant relationship
between board composition in the form of representation of outside independent directors and
firm performance, implying that the outside independent directors did not add potential
economic value to firms in Bangladesh. This conclusion is based upon the results shown in Table
5 (p.88). Although the BDCOMP coefficient found in Rashid et al. (2010) is not statistically
significant, its positive sign is consistent with the literature presented (pp.77-82) which
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demonstrates independent directors positively contribute to performance through good
monitoring of management.
Chowdhury (2010, p.108) argued that “I am not sure how the authors can claim that
external independent directors are ‘good monitors’ as this has not been tested in this paper”.
However, in referring to our results he states “design of the β1 is POSITIVE indicating the
independent directors’ positive contribution to profitability; however, this substantial positive
contribution of independent directors is rejected by the authors on the grounds of its statistical
significance”. In Chowdhury’s own admission, we have tested the relationship between board
independence and firm performance, a well recognised indicator of good monitoring in corporate
governance literature (Bathala & Rao 1995; Kaymak & Bektas 2008; Luan & Tang 2007;
Nicholson & Kiel 2007; Zahra & Pearce II 1989).
While acknowledging the potential contribution of a “properly specified econometric
model” (Chowdhury 2010, p.108), the authors contend studies in the accounting discipline are
artefacts of temporal contextual and social processes (Hines 1988). Acknowledging the
limitations of a modelling tool, the authors see the contribution of this study as an exploration of
the circumstance of a developing economy. In a practical sense generalisability in the form of a
specified model is neither sought nor possible.
Based on the above analytical presentation, we question the strengths of Chowdhury’s
(2010) criticisms and argue that the factors discussed in Chowdhury (2010) do not necessarily
impair the outcome of the Rashid et al. (2010) paper. This study seeks to contribute to the
increasing literature by recognising the interests of readers in gaining more insight and
understanding of empirical corporate governance research, with special reference to the
Bangladesh context.
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